1. The theory applies to reputation about a norm.
    1. On the other hand, all reputation is about a norm, in some sense. Well there is some case of reputation about skill, but even in that case, one could say this is all about the norm that says that you have to perform well (in your profession, for example)
  2. About that norm, there are four essential roles.
    1. T
    2. E
    3. B
    4. G
  3. Here, we explain who they are.
    1. Reputation involves four sets of agents:
      1. • a nonempty set T of agents are the targets of the evaluation
      2. • a nonempty set E of agents who share the evaluation a nonempty set T of evaluation targets
      3. • a nonempty set B of beneficiaries, i.e., the agents sharing the goal with regard to which the elements of T are evaluated
      4. • a nonempty set G (gossipers) of agents (also called Third-party) who share the meta-belief that members of E share the evaluation; this is the set of all agents aware of the effect of reputation (as stated above, effect is only one component of it; awareness of the process is not implied).
  4. Now, once individuated the sets, we wonder what are the superpositions between them. Is everyone at the same time a target and an evaluator? A target and a gossiper? Or are the roles clearly distinguished?
    1. Combining the values of such intersections gives rise to countless situations. By reducing each intersection to a binary dimension, where values are either high or low, we can describe a finite tree of situations.
    2. Here is the tree.
      1. Don't expand this node!
        1. TEBG
          1. T / EBG
          2. TE / BG
          3. TB / EG
          4. TG / EB
          5. E / TBG
          6. B / TEG
          7. G / TEB
        2. T / E / B / G
    3. In fact (since permutations do not count) there are only 9 cases.
  5. What are the effects of the different situations?
    1. We need some hypotheses about the forces in play - what does it means to share the same group, and what it means to be in separated groups.
      1. To build a better theory, of course, we would need to specify also what it means to be in the same group.
        1. Groups are normall considered to be unite, solidal and self-helping
        2. However, expections can happen - sometimes by design; consider a parliament, whose members are supposed to hold differing views on nearly all politcal matters
          1. With the exceptions of matters "of national interest" (in the classic nation-state credo), on one hand, and on the matter of members wages, on the other hand.
        3. Thus, a better theory would consider what are the goals of groups, and differentiate effects on the base of these goals. Not this one.
      2. To keep things simple, we consider a group as one with common interests and goals, animated by solidarity , cohesion and harmony of members towards each other.
        1. We know this is an excessive, unrealistic simplification; however, it is needed here for the sake of tractability.
    2. We examine the results in the terms of
      1. the positive/negative bias that they produce
      2. the amount of response they elicit (tendency to provide an answer even if uncertain vs. to remain silent)
      3. Evidence produced in the relevant literature, cited in the second section of this paper, matches these expectations. As a matter of fact, a system characterised by these intersections among agent roles does not qualify as reputational, according to our analysis, but rather as a system for image formation, augmented by centralised collection and distribution. These rather extreme examples show the advantages of the model presented so far: it allows for concrete predictions to be made and tested against available evidence, concerning both real life examples and technological applications. Predictive models are much needed especially in the latter domain, where theory-driven expectations are merely economic (game-theoretic). They concern the positive effects of sellers? profiles on economic efficiency, rather than the functioning of reputation itself. Our claim is that feedback profile is less than reputation. Of course, even though a system like eBay is not a truly reputational system, it seems to be good enough as to meet market criteria (i.e., volume of transactions and level of prices). However, how healthy and stable is a market (whether electronic or traditional) characterised by feedback under-provision and overrating? More generally, what are the specific effects of overrating and underrating? To answer these questions, we will turn to artificial, simulation-based, data.
    3. The factors that contribute to our predictons are connected to the decisions each group will take.
      1. The decisions are
        1. E
          1. In case of uncertainty, bias to good/bad evaluation
        2. T
          1. cheating risking a bad evaluation?
        3. B
          1. none
        4. G
          1. Transmit info if uncertain
      2. And the factors influencing them are
        1. Commitment
          1. E to T
          2. E to B
          3. G to B
          4. G to T (in a lesser measure)
          5. T to B (though obvious)
        2. Responsibility / Accountability
          1. exists only if someone is also T (but could even be T of a different process)
        3. (this is old material to re-elaborate)
          1. the higher the intersect between G and E, the higher G's commitment, and therefore their responsibility and attitude to provision. On the contrary, the overlapping between G and B (and, what is the same, between E and B) gives rise to a beneficiary-oriented benevolence, with the consequent negative bias. Instead, a higher intersect between G and T (or between E and T) leads to the leniency bias. Finally, the intersection between T and B concerns the perception of effects of gossip on targets. The higher this perception, the stronger the expected responsibility of gossipers.
          2. G and E
          3. G's commitment
          4. G's responsibility
          5. provision
          6. G and B
          7. Benevolence on B
          8. Negative Bias
          9. .. what is the same, E and B (the same??)
          10. G and T OR E and T
          11. Leniency bias
          12. T and B
          13. responsibiity of G
          14. witholding of evaluations?
    4. Thus, with repsect to the new tree, we can say...
      1. T / E / B / G
        1. The monads
        2. G and E different from T -> low provision, low circulation, no bias.
      2. T / EBG
        1. Politicians
        2. An group interested in T - but totally separated from it - performs reputation evaluation AND is the beneficiary of it.
      3. E / TBG
        1. Judges
        2. The evaluators judge you for your own good; they don't gossip, only judge.
        3. And this was also the teacher one...
      4. B / TEG
        1. Children
        2. The adults discuss and evaluate children education.
      5. G / TEB
        1. This one is strange.
        2. Who can gossip about a process that does not involve them at all? Perhaps the ...
        3. scandalistc newspapers?
      6. TE / BG
        1. Maybe the doctors? They check on each other for safety.. or the lawyers?
      7. TB / EG
        1. This was students (targets) and teachers? Hmm no
      8. TG / EB
      9. TEBG
    5. Other notes:
      1. E and T are usually the same but not always - targets can be evaluated externally (ex. agents of commerce evaluated centrally)
      2. To transmit you need to have
  6. Unicity or molteplicity of the process
    1. By this complicated name, we mean the presence of more than one - distinct- reputation process. An example is just peer review; in peer review, there are several levels and then, responsibility connects them, because someone making a mistake on level 1 as a gossiper could be held accountable on level 2 - as a target.